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PLOTINUS AND 
GNOSTIC THAUMATURGY 
Harold E. REMUS 
RÉSUMÉ. — L'analyse de l'attaque de Plotin contre la thaumaturgie gnostique 
fEnnéades, II, 9) le révèle comme un défenseur de la culture grecque, spécialement 
de la philosophie platonicienne, et d'un philosopher professionnel (par opposition au 
dilettantisme) ; les gnostiques sont en défaut sur ces trois plans. Cependant 
l'attaque de Plotin suggère en outre une tentative de se défaire de positions qui 
furent jadis proches de la sienne, ou encore de supprimer une tension continuelle 
dans sa propre pensée, voire les deux à la fois : la tension entre la cosmologie du 
Timée et la psychologie du Phédon et du Phèdre. Encore que Plotin compte les 
gnostiques parmi ses amis, il écrit sans espoir de les gagner à lui, mais plutôt à 
l'intention de ses disciples. Son attitude résignée est une reconnaissance implicite 
que ce qui est en litige entre les gnostiques et lui-même, ce ne sont pas simplement 
des questions ou des pratiques isolées, mais ce que les sociologues de la connaissance 
appellent des mondes sociaux et culturels. 
THOUGH PLOTINUS never explicitly refers to "gnostics" in the treatise commonly entitled Against the Gnostics (Enn. 2.9) *, the treatise was understood 
by his first and subsequent editors as directed against them 2, and his description of 
the objects of his polemic accords with what are commonly regarded as general 
1. A phrase like xoùç rjôn eyvcoKoxaç {Enn. 2.9.15.22-23) may refer to persons who lay claim to special 
knowledge, i.e., gnostics. This is as close as Plotinus comes to using the label. 2.9.13.10, where 
Plotinus sets forth educated and harmonious gnosis (7iS7rai8euu£vr)ç... Kai êuueÀ.oûç yvcùaetoç) — i.e., 
traditional Greek gnosis — as a foil to gnostics' fear of the celestial spheres, may be an oblique 
reference to the gnostics' supposed gnosis. Throughout I cite the Enneads and Porphyry's Vita from 
P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer (eds.), Plotini Opera, Vol. 1, Porphyrii Vita Plotini. Enneades I-III, and 
Vol. 2, Enneades IV-V. Plotiniana Arabica ad Codicum Fidem Anglice Ver tit Geoffrey Lewis (Museum 
Lessianum, Series Philosophica, 33, 34; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, and Brussels: L'Édition 
Universelle, 1951, 1959). 
2. PORPHYRY, VitaPlot. 16.11: (3i[3?aov 07tep*ripoç xoùç rvœo"xiKouç"e>7teypayàuev- In referring to what 
is evidently Enn. 2.9. Porphyry describes it as directed against those who say that the maker of the 
cosmos and the cosmos itself are evil {Vita Plot. 24 : Tipôç xoùç KOIKÔV XÔV ônuioupyôv xou KÔOUOU Kaï 
xôv KÔauov KCIKÔV etvou ^éyovxaç), that is, against persons with "gnostic" traits. 
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gnostic characteristics. The treatise has received some attention3, but Plotinus' 
argument specifically with gnostic thaumaturgy has not been examined closely. Such 
an examination leads to consideration of some basic issues (and tensions) in Plotinus' 
thought ; it also illuminates his stance as a defender of Greek culture and is 
interesting from the standpoint of sociology of knowledge. 
Plotinus' polemic takes its start from first-hand acquaintance with gnostics4 and 
with gnostic writings 5. He looks with scorn on what he labels the practice of magic 
(uayeuEiv) by gnostics — their use of chants, charms, enchantments, suasions, 
sounds, breathings, hissings6. He also ridicules the gnostics' claim that they free from 
disease by ridding the diseased, with a word (èÇaipeîv ^oycp), of the evil daemons 
which supposedly cause disease (Enn. 2.9.14.11-15). Such claims and practices 
Plotinus lumps with the feats performed by magicians which cause the masses to 
marvel7. 
Plotinus' argument against what he reports as the gnostics' view of the cause and 
cure of disease recalls the polemic, in the Hippocratic corpus, against the common 
view of epilepsy as a "sacred disease." Like the Hippocratic author, Plotinus argues 
that disease has readily discernible causes and need not be attributed to evil 
daemons; the cures of diseases demonstrate the same thing {Enn. 2.9.14.17-23). By 
various reductiones ad absurdum Plotinus demonstrates that the theory of demonic 
causation of disease and the gnostic view of its cure are logically unnecessary 
(2.4.14.23-25). Plotinus contrasts such muddled and arrogant thinking with "our" 
philosophy, with its straightforwardness, clarity, stability, and discretion, and its 
pursuit of a reverent rather than an arrogant disposition (TO oeuvov, ou TO al'iOaôeç) 
(2.9.14.38-43). This philosophy is the standard by which to measure the views of 
others8, such as gnostic teachings, which are, throughout, diametrically opposed to 
it9. In his polemic Plotinus demonstrates how his philosophy is employed to take the 
measure of gnostic "magic". To show the absurdity and arrogance of gnostic chants 
and the like Plotinus asks how sounds can affect incorporeal beings 10. And what 
3. For example, in the still useful study by Carl SCHMIDT, Plotins Stellung zum Gnosticismus und 
kirchlichen Chhstentum (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, 
20/4; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1901); Thomas WHITTAKER, The Neo-Platonists: A Study in the History of 
Hellenism (4th éd.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928; reprinted, Hildesheim : Olms, 
1961), 82-87; J. M. RIST, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967), see Index of Passages ; R. T. WALLIS, Neo-Platonism (London : Duckworth, 1972), 12-13 ; and 
some of the studies cited below. 
4. Enn. 2.9.10.3-4. 
5. Enn. 2.9.14.36-37 : Plotinus leaves it to his readers to investigate the gnostics' other views by reading 
(âvayivdJaKouoiv ; scil. xàç ypacpàç auxcav). 
6. Enn. 2.9.14.4-8 (yor|xeiaç KOII 0éX,Çeiç KCU Treiaeiç... icai rjxouç Kaï rcpoajtveuaeic xat aiyuoùç xriç 
(pwvfjç KOÙ xh &XXa, oaa ÉKEÏ uayeueiv yeypotTtxai). 
7. Enn. 2.9.14.15-17 (énayye^Xôuevoi asuvôxepoi uev av elvai ôo^au:v rcapà xotç rcoÀAoïç, oi xàç napa 
xoiç uâyoïç ôuvâueiç GauuàÇouai). 
8. Enn. 2.9.14.43 (xà bè'âXXa xœ xoiouxa) napafiâXXeiv). 
9. Enn. 2.9.14.43-44 (évavxicoxaxa... ôià Tràvxœv). 
10. Enn. 2.9.14.8-9 (rcœç (pcovaîç xà aaœuaxa ;). Cf. Enn. 4.6.1 where Plotinus argues against theories of 
perception that posit a material impression of an external object on the soul. 
14 
PLOTINUS AND GNOSTIC THAUMATURGY 
presumption to address such chants to the higher powers with the intent of making 
them obey their (the gnostics') will (2.9.14.1-8) ! To do so is to diminish the majesty 
of those powers (2.9.14.9-11). As a foil to such practices Plotinus puts forward the 
self-control and well-ordered life-style advocated by philosophers and, as already 
noted, the superior nature and goals of his philosophy (2.9.14.12-13). 
Even as Platonic philosophy is the context that informs Plotinus' attack on 
gnostic "magic", so Greek culture is the context of that philosophy, and, like Celsus, 
Plotinus is a self-conscious representative of both. This self-consciousness is seen in 
Plotinus' assertion that the gnostics' thaumaturgical practices, while appealing to the 
masses, do not deceive persons schooled in Greek culture, of which Greek philosophy 
is the capstone n . It is seen also when Plotinus, like Celsus before him 12, assumes that 
that ancient culture and its authentic representatives, past and present, are superior to 
persons like the gnostics who, while clearly indebted to that culture, nonetheless 
ridicule and pervert it. Thus, while gnostics may correctly derive some of their 
teachings from Plato and other divine men of the past13, the things they have taken 
from the ancients (xoîç Tca^atoïç) have taken on some additions that are not 
fitting14. Such new teachings "have been found outside the truth15." Plotinus 
summarizes some of these points where the gnostics stand in opposition (evaviioCaGat) 
to the ancients : "they introduce becomings and dissolutions of all kinds, find fault 
with the universe, censure the soul for its association with the body, criticize the one 
who directs the universe, identify the demiurge with Soul, and ascribe to the latter the 
same properties as those possessed by individual souls 16". Even when the gnostics 
11. Enn. 2.9.14.15-18 (xoùç uévxoi ev> (ppovouvxoç OÙK av TtsfOoiev; the rest of the text is given in n. 7 
above). 
12. See Carl ANDRESEN, Logos und Nomos : Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum (Arbeiten zur 
Kirchengeschichte, 30; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1955). 
13. The gnostic's general dependence on Plato and other "divine men" : Plato, Enn. 2.9.6.10-11 (6'À.CÙÇ yap 
xà uèv aûxoYç Ttapct xou rRdxœvoç eiÀ.r|7rxai) ; "divine men" (xoùç Oeiouç avôpaç, 2.9.6.36), designated 
as "those more ancient persons" (£KS{V(ÛV œç TtaA-aioxepcov, 2.9.6.37), including Plato (2.9.6.42); cf. 
2.9.6.5-7, the gnostics contrive neologisms to commend their own school (xrjç lôîaç aipeaecoç) to 
others as though they (the gnostics) had no connection with "the ancient Greek school" (xrjç âpxaïaç 
nviKrfç). Specifically the gnostics are dependent on Plato for their teachings on "ascents from the 
cave" (avafj&oeic IK XOÎ5 o7rr)A.aiou, 2.9.6.8-9); cf. Plato, Rep. 7.514Aff.), "the judgments and the 
rivers in Hades and transmigrations" (aï ÔIKCU KCXI oî 7roxauo\ oî iv Âiôou KCCI at liexevaiouaxcoaeiç, 
2.9.6.13; cf. Plato, Phaed. lllDff.), "immortality of the soul, the noetic cosmos, the first deity, the 
necessity for the soul to escape association with the body, separation from the body, flight from 
becoming to being — these things are posited in Plato" (xaîJxa yàp Keîusva Ttapà xœ nXaxœvi, 
2.9.6.39-42); the gnostics "have heard Plato many times blaming the body for the sorts of 
impediments it offers to the soul" (2.9.17.2-3); the plurality of noetic entitles (being, nous, demiurge, 
soul) in the gnostics' teaching derives from the Timaeus {Enn. 2.9.6.14-19; Plotinus cites from Tim. 
39E 7-9). 
14. Enn. 2.9.6.55-57 (xà 8' uoxepov xouxoiç nap' eiceîvcov À.r)(p9évxa, TtpoaGfJKaç hi xivaç ouôsv 
TrpoonKouaaç eiXncpota). 
15. Enn. 2.9.6.11-12 (Ô'aa Kaivoiououaiv... laùxa ff^ co TTJÇ a^.r|0eîaç eupniai). 
16. Enn. 2.9.6.58-62 (yeveaeiç îaxï cpGopàç eiaayovTsç navxeXeXç Kaï ueucpouevoi xœôe TCO navri KOI xr\v 
Ttpôç xô ocoua Koivœviav TTJ vj/uxf) CUTICOUEVOI KOI xôv ÔIOIKOÛVTOI TÔÔE TO nàv yeyoviec KCÙ eiç 
TaÙTOv ayovxeç xôv onuioupyov xr\ \\ivx^\ Kaï ta auià nâQr\ ôiôovxeç, cbtep Kaï xoîç êv uépei). 
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draw on Plato they misread him in constructing their cosmogony17 and cosmology 18 
and their teachings on soul19 and the noetic realities20. The gnostics' assertion that the 
association of the soul with the body is not to the soul's advantage originated, not 
with them (2.9.7.2-4), but with Plato (2.9.17.1-4). They misread him, however, in 
simply hating the body (ibid.) rather than accepting the necessity of remaining in the 
body, living in houses prepared by a good sister soul21 and learning to take off this 
bodily nature in thought in order to behold the noetic sphere22. And rather than 
viewing the visible cosmos as wicked and the celestial bodies as hostile23, they should 
follow Plato (or Plotinus) in viewing this world as a beautiful image of the higher 
world24 and the celestial bodies as beneficent deities25. 
Plotinus' annoyance with the gnostics is in part the annoyance of the profes-
sional philosopher with dilettantes who fail to carry premises and assertions through 
to their logical conclusions. If the gnostics don't perceive where the rashness of their 
cosmic pessimism leads (oi)6 OTTOD TO Gpdooç aôioîj TOGTO xwpeï), Plotinus does, and 
17. Enn. 2.9.4.2ff. : against the gnostic idea that the visible world resulted from the moral failure 
(acpaXeiaccv) of soul, Plotinus argues that a soul that declined (EVEUGE) would forget the things of the 
higher, noetic world (xco zm'kzkr\<3Qa\ br\kbvx\ xc5v EKET) ; "if it forgot, how could it function as a 
craftsman, for whence does it fashion except from the things it beheld in that world?" (el 8E 
87T£^d9exo, Ttcûç ôrjuioupyeî; Ttô9ev yap TtotsT rj ft, aw EIÔEV EKET). The unspoken premise here is 
Plato's Timaeus where the demiurge fashions this world after the model of the living being (TO Çœov ; 
Tim. 30C-D ; 39E). Similarly 2.9.6.24-25 (the gnostics give a false account of Plato's teaching on the 
way in which the world was fashioned). 
18. Enn. 2.9.4.22ff. : persons who find many vexatious things (noXXa... 8uax£prj) in the visible world rate 
it too highly, thinking it should be the same as the noetic world rather than an image of it (et avouai 
TOV auTÔv eTvai TÛ) VO^TCD, àXXa uf\ eiKova EKEIVOU) — even so, what more beautiful image of that 
world (KaX?doL)V EIKOW EKEIVOU) could there be than this one? (Cf. Tim. 29D-30B.) 
19. Enn. 2.9.4.1-2: the gnostics' assertion that the soul made the world after it had shed its wings errs in 
referring this passage (Plato, Phaedrus 246C) to the soul of the All (f^  TOU navtôç) (rather than to 
individual souls). They err, too, in saying their own soul and that of the worst persons is divine (Bstav) 
but yet denying to the celestial bodies a share in the immortal soul (uf| xn,ç cxGavàxou K£Koiva)vr)K£vai) 
(2.9.5.8-14). 
20. Enn. 2.9.6.16-21 : the gnostics, not understanding (ou OUVEVTEÇ) Plato (Tim. 39E 7-9), interpret him as 
positing three nous's ; they think, moreover, that, according to Plato (Korea rRaxoova), the purposing 
nous (xôv 8È 8iavouu£Vov) is the demiurge, although they are far from knowing who the demiurge is 
and frequently identify soul with the demiurge. 
21. Enn. 2.9.18.14-16 (8ei 8E UEVEIV UEV év OI'KOIÇ aœua ê'xovxaç KaxaaKeuaaGcTaiv àno yu^nç aôeX(prjç 
àya6f)ç). 
22. Enn. 2.9.17.4-5 (e^pf^v xauxn,v 7T£pieAÔvxaç xf\ ôiavoîa lôetv xô Xoi7xov, o(poiïpav vonjriv). 
23. Enn. 2.9.15.21, nothing in this world is considered beautiful by gnostics (xouxcov yap ouôèv auxoTç 
Ka?i6v); 2.9.16.1-2, they despise the world and the gods and the other beautiful things in it (TO 
KdTCKppovfiaai KOOUOU Kai Geœv TWV EV aÙTœ KOI TWV aXXwv Ka^wv); 2.9.6.59, they find fault with 
the universe (text in n. 16 above); the celestial regions do not produce evil persons here below 
(2.9.8.34-35) and the cosmic spheres (TOUÇ TOU KOOUOU acpaîpaiç) are not to be feared, despite their 
fiery bodies (2.9.13.9ff.). 
24. Enn. 2.9.4.22ff. (see n. 18 above). 
25. Plotinus praises the celestial spheres for their beauty and for their contribution to the functioning of 
the All (Enn. 2.9.13.14-20; cf. Plato, Tim. 38C-E, where the celestial bodies perform their appointed 
tasks of marking off time), for their souls (Enn. 2.9.13.12-13 ; cf. Tim. 38E and Laws 10.898D), and for 
the reference that the stars' symmetry, good order, and form (sîôoç) have to their sources (Enn. 
2.9.16.49-55; cf. Laws, where Plato infers to deity from the earth, sun, stars, and the ordering of 
seasons [10.886A] and from the orderly motion of the cosmos [10.896Dff.]). 
16 
PLOTINUS AND GNOSTIC THAUMATURGY 
demonstrates the untenability of such pessimism (2.9.13. Iff.) as well as of their 
cosmogony (2.9.12.33ff.), their view of the cure of disease (2.9.14.24-35), their denial 
of providence (2.9.16.14ff.), and their despising of the celestial bodies (2.9.16.1-14). It 
is persons unskilled in argumentation and ignorant of educated gnosis, i.e., Greek 
philosophical tradition, who would be fearful of the fiery spheres in the sky26. Their 
ignorance is shown also by their talk of virtue without defining it or ever having 
written on the subject and without explaining how one attains virtue (2.9.15.27ff.). It 
is seen also in their clumsy behavior in setting forth their teachings : rather than 
demonstrating these in a friendly, philosophical, and even-handed way (euuevcoç Kal 
(piAoaoqxDÇ... ôiKaîcoç), they ridicule and insult those who differ with them 
(2.9.6.35ff.). 
In part, however, Plotinus' polemic against the gnostics may represent an effort 
to purge himself of positions that were once close to his own or to suppress a 
continuing tension in his own thought, or both. The tension is generally acknow-
ledged by scholars27. In the formulation of Dodds and Armstrong, it is the tension 
between the cosmology of the Timaeus (with its affirmation of the visible cosmos as 
an admirable product of soul) and the psychology of the Phaedo and the Phaedrus 
(with their view of the soul's descent into human form as unfortunate, the result of 
the soul's loss of its "wings")28. Scholars who have attended to the chronological 
order of Plotinus' treatises and/or to a genetic study of his thought29 see his attack 
on the gnostic view that arrogance and audacity (tolma) motivate the soul in its task 
of making30 as a disowning of a view which he himself once held31, which he found in 
Plato (Enn. 4.8.1), and which he had once tried to reconcile with the cosmogony of 
the Timaeus32. Plotinus moved, it seems, from ascribing the soul's descent to tolma, 
to rejection of that view and ascription of it to the gnostics, to a positive view of the 
descent33. "Whatever his earlier doubts, Plotinus emerges in the end as the upholder 
26 Enn. 2.9.13.9-10 (xî yàp (popepôv e'xouaiv autai, wç cpopouoi TOOÇ àneipouç ^ôycov Kai 7tS7iai8euuévr|ç 
avr|KÔouç Kaî iuue^ouç yvœoscoç ;). 
27. See the scholars cited in E. R. DODDS, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety : Some Aspects of 
Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (New York : Norton, 1970), 25, n. 1. 
28. Cf. DODDS, ibid., 25 ; A. H. ARMSTRONG, The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval 
Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1967), 230. 
29. Cf. the observations by H. C. Puech, R. Harder, and H. Dôrrie in the discussion following the 
presentation by Puech, "Plotin et les gnostiques", in E. R. DODDS et al., Les sources de Plotin: Dix 
exposés et discussions (Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique, 5 ; Geneva : Fondation Hardt, 1960), 183, 
185, 190; DODDS, Pagan and Christian, 25-26; G. QUISPEL, "From Mythos to Logos", in his Gnostic 
Studies I (Publications de l'Institut historique et archéologique néerlandais de Stamboul, 34/1 ; 
Istanbul : Nederlands Historisch-Archeologisch Instituut in het Nabije Oosten, 1974), 160 (originally 
published in Eranos Jahrbuch 39 [1970]). 
30. Enn. 2.9.11.21-22 (ôi'aÂaÇoveiav 
31. Enn. 4.7.13.11 (according to Porphyry, Vita 4.24-25, this treatise is the second in chronological order); 
5.1.1.1-5 (chronologically the tenth treatise), where Plotinus says souls forget the father because of 
evil rooting in audacity, birth, the assertion of differentiation, and the desire to be self-possessing (r\ 
xoXua Kaî f| yeveaiç Kaî r\ Jtpcùir] exspotriç Kaî TO (3ouÀ,r|0fîvat 8e èauxœv eïvai) ; cf. 4.8.5.9-10 
(chronologically the sixth treatise), where Plotinus says the soul's descent may be marred by undue 
zeal (upoOuuia... 7rA.£iovi). 
32. Enn. 4.8.5 ; cf. DODDS, Pagan and Christian, 25. 
33. See the references cited in DODDS, Pagan and Christian, 25-26. 
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of Hellenic rationalism" 34, affirming the goodness of the visible cosmos and the 
culture predicated on that traditional Greek affirmation35. 
The gnostics' thaumaturgical claims and their view of the cause and cure of 
disease are only egregious aspects of what Plotinus sees as a threat to that culture. He 
defends it, as we have seen, against gnostic perversion and subversion. It is evident 
from the foregoing that such defense is a concern Plotinus shares with Celsus. And 
even as Celsus views Christians as an alien body in pagan society, so Plotinus finds in 
his gnostic opponents some of the same alienating traits adduced by Celsus in his 
polemic. The gnostics' pessimistic otherworldliness noted above and their absurd 
elitism and narcissism 36 set them apart from traditional pagan society, as do their 
disrespect for traditional deities37, their abdication of responsibility for persons 
outside their own circle38, and their disdain for "all laws in this world and for the 
34. Ibid., 26 ; cf. further DODDS, "Numenius and Ammonius", in Les sources de Plotin (cited above, n. 29), 
22 : Plotinus maintains "the rational Hellenic tradition against the pessimistic otherworldliness which 
found its fullest expression in Gnosticism." Cf. also R. Harder, who observes that Hellenistic 
cosmology, which perceived the cosmos as one great polis, is revived in Plotinus ; his sharpest criticism 
of the gnostics is directed against their assertion that the world is evil. "Es ist ihm bewusst dass die 
Rettung der griechischen Bildung an die Wiedereinsetzung des Kosmos in seine Wiirde hàngt. Dièse 
Wiirde ist die des Notwendigen : ein klares, rational durchgeformtes Bild gegeniiber Wirrnis und 
Willkiir." R. HARDER, "Plotins Abhandlung gegen die Gnostiker", in his Kleine Schriften, ed. by 
W. Marg (Munich: Beck, 1960; originally published in Die Antike 5 [1929], 78-84), 301-02; the 
quotation is from p. 302. 
35. Even in the relatively late treatise (chronologically, number 33) against the gnostics, however, a 
tension persists between viewing any procession from the One or Nous as a declension (as gnostics 
said) and as good (as the Timaeus said) ; the latter we have noted (above, at notes 24-25) ; for the 
former cf. Enn. 2.9.13.32-33, "there [in the higher world] soul is worse than Nous and Nous is less than 
something else" (KCU yap EKEI \\ivxr\ X£~pov voÏÏ Kaï ouxoç &>Aou EÀaxxov). A. H. Armstrong, in the 
Loeb edition of Plotinus, ad loc., cites as further instances the late treatises 3.8.8.35-36 (chrono-
logically, number 30) and 3.7.11.15ff. (chronologically, number 45). 
36. Enn. 2.9.9.52ff. : "senseless persons" (avOpomoi avortai) are persuaded by gnostics who tell them that 
they will be better, not only than humans, but also than gods, and that they are sons of God whereas 
those whom they honored as sons, according to tradition (EK rcaxEpœv), are not ; the gnostics also tell 
them that even without exerting themselves they are better than heaven. Enn. 2.9.16.16-17: the 
gnostics say there is providential care of themselves alone (ÀÉyouoi yàp auxSv 7tpovo£~v au uovov). 
On such narcissism Plotinus comments {Enn. 2.9.9.47-51) that to suppose there is room alongside God 
only for oneself is like flying in dreams and deprives one of the possibility of becoming divine, so far as 
that is possible for a human soul. Cf. Celsus' ridicule of what he regards as Jewish and Christian 
narcissism, C. Cels. 4.23. 
37. Enn. 2.9.9.52ff. (see preceding note) ; 2.9.16. Iff. ; 2.9.18.17ff. 
38. Enn. 2.9.15.18-20: seeing that they reject traditional virtue there remain for them only pleasure and 
what is not held in common with other persons and a concern for their needs alone (SOIE auxotç 
KataXEiTtEaôat xfïv f|8ovT|v Kaï xo Tispi auxoùç Kaï xb ou KOIVÔV rtpôç àXXovç avÔpamouç Ka'i xô xfjç 
XpEÎaç (iovov). The foil to Plotinus' perception of gnostic irresponsibility is his own civic con-
sciousness and influence, as reported by Porphyry and evidenced in his own affirmation of civic 
virtues ; see the references and discussion in R. HARDER, "Zur Biographie Plotins", in his Kleine 
Schriften (cited above, n. 34), 280 ff. ; A. H. ARMSTRONG, Cambridge History (cited above, n. 28), 
202-03, 229. Cf. also Harder's observations in "Plotins Abhandlung gegen die Gnostiker" (cited 
above, n. 34), 302: "Scharfsichtig erkennt Plotin den tiefsten Mangel der Gegner, ihr 'Nur mit sich 
selbst beschàftigt sein', der Hang zum 'Nicht Gemeinsamen' ; diese gemeinschaftswidrige Isoliertheit 
hindert sie am Anerkennen, am Geltenlassen, fiihrt sie zur Verachtung der andern Wesen, welche 
Hybris ist. Plotin lehrt dagegen in neuem Sinne Weltbiirgertum..." 
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virtue won long ago" 39. Such disdain subverts the socialization processes that sustain 
culture and society40. It accords with this that gnostics nihilate the founders and 
foremost representatives of pagan culture (2.9.6.36, 44, 49-51) and that, far from 
being an elite group, as they imagine, embrace the worst sort of people41, to the 
detriment of society. 
While Plotinus' polemic is sharp at times, it is not as shrill as that of Celsus. 
Plotinus' ultimate attitude to his opponents (though not to their teachings) is one of 
resignation. "What is one to say" (xi av TIÇ eutoi), asks Plotinus, in face of some of 
the gnostics' hopelessly muddled notions about the soul (2.9.5.22-23)? The gnostics 
need to be taught — "if they would bear with it in good spirit" (ei eùyvcouôvcoç 
otvexoivTo) — the nature of soul and of the demiurge (2.9.8.1-6). In an obvious 
reference to his opponents, he asks whether anyone — "unless he had gone daft" 
—would put up with the thought that human wisdom is superior to that of the 
celestial deities42. At one point Plotinus pauses to profess compunctions about 
continuing his detailed refutation of gnostic teachings : he has gnostic friends, and he 
has no hope of convincing them of their error in any case. They "chanced upon this 
teaching before they became our friends", and now "a certain regard for them 
possesses us"43. "I do not know how they persist in it [gnostic teaching]", he 
confesses44. Plotinus' treatise, then, is directed not to gnostics but against them, for 
the sake of his pupils : "The things we have said are addressed to our pupils, not to 
them [the gnostics] — for there is nothing more that might be done to persuade them 
— in order that they [the pupils] may not be disturbed by them [the gnostics], who do 
not provide proofs (for how could they?) but, rather, make audacious assertions..." 45 
Plotinus' attitude to his gnostic opponents is, at least, an implicit recognition 
that what is in conflict between him and them is not simply discrete issues or practices 
— "magic", cosmogony and cosmology, anthropology — but whole ways of 
constructing reality, social and cultural "worlds"46. Thus, while Plotinus may have 
39. Enn. 2.9.15.12-13 (rcavTaç vououç TOÙÇ evxauGa aTiuaaaç Kai xr\v àpeTrjv xr\v EK navTÔç TOÛ xpôvoo 
dvr|upT}|iévr|v). 
40. Enn. 2.9.15.15-17: "gnostic teaching does away with self-control and with the righteousness 
implanted by mores and brought to fulfillment by reason and by training" ; in short, it nihilates the 
things "by which a person might become morally excellent" (dveIA.8 TO te aoxppoveTv icaî TT|V EV TOTÇ 
r]9eoi auu(puTov 8iKaioa6vr]v TTJV TE^EIOUUEVTIV SK kôyou Kai aaKr|a£coç Kaï ô'Xcoç KaG'a aTiouôaîoç 
àVGpcorcoç av yévouo). 
41. Enn. 2.9.5.8-9, gnostics say the souls of the most worthless persons (TWV (pauXoxciKov avGpomcov) are 
immortal and divine; 2.9.18.17-18, they call the most worthless persons (TOUÇ (pau^oxotTouç) 
"brothers". 
42. Enn. 2.9.8.38-39 (xama TÎÇ av UT) EK(ppcov yeyEvr|uÉvoç àvàaxoiTo ;). Cf. also 2.9.9.52ff. (n. 36 above), 
where Plotinus calls persons who fall for such assertions"senseless" (âvôr\xai). 
43. Enn. 2.9.10.3-4 (aïôàç yàp TIÇ rjuaç è'xei npoç Ttvaç TGW cpiXcov, of TOUTÛ) TS XÔJ(Û ÉVTUXOVTEÇ 
KpoTepov r\ riuTv (pîXoi yevéaGai). 
44. Enn. 2.9.10.5 (O6K OTÔ' b'rccoç èV airtou uevouoi). 
45. Enn. 2.9.10.7-11 (a^X.' f|ueîç 7ipôç TOÎJÇ yvcopiuouç, ou 7tp6ç auToùç .^éyovTeç — 7tÀ.éov yàp oûôsv av 
ytyvouo rcpoç TÔ TteiGeiv auTobç —tva m^ rcpôç auT(5v evox^oivTO OÛK d7toôet^£iç KOUIÇOVTWV —rccSç 
yàp ; — àM.' caïauôiÇouevœv Taîrca dpriKauev). 
46. For this terminology see P. BERGER, The Sacred Canopy : Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion 
(Garden City, N.Y. : Anchor Doubleday, 1969), ch. 1. 
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denigrated some of the gnostics' beliefs and practices as "magic", this does not mean 
he rejects them simply because they are "magic". Certain passages, both in Porphyry 
and in Plotinus, support the claim that Plotinus, like others in his day, believed in the 
efficacy of practices designated as "magic" 47. His objection to the gnostic variety, as 
we have seen, was to the premises that were operative and the use to which it was put ; 
gnostic "magic" was part of the gnostic "world", a social and cultural world Plotinus 
found incompatible with his own48. 
47. See the passages and scholarly discussions cited in ARMSTRONG, Cambridge History (cited above, 
n. 28), 207-09. 
48. This is true whether or not the gnostics whom Plotinus knew professed some form of Christianity ; on 
the construing of Porphyry's syntax in Vita 16 (are the SXkox., aipextKot to be included among xcov 
Xpiatiavwv?) and the identification of the objects of Plotinus' polemic in Enn. 2.9 see H. C. PUECH, 
"Plotin et les gnostiques", and the ensuing discussion, in Les sources de Plotin (cited above, n. 29), 
161-90. 
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